

CRISIS MANAGEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN IN POST 9/11 ERA

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***Abstract:** The enduring antagonism between India and Pakistan that is augmented by feelings of threat perceptions has given birth of recurrent crises. This research consists of crises Border confrontation of 2001-2002, Mumbai Blast November 2008, attack on the Indian Army's brigade headquarters at Uri1 September 2016 and Pulwama attack 2019. A central objective of the present study is to highlight the significance of crisis management as a way of managing the conflicts between two nuclear powers. This research examines some of these crises in an attempt both to understand and highlight the ways in which these were managed and ultimately defused by the adversaries. The theoretical frame work of research is framed within crisis management theory.*

Keywords: Crisis, Threat perceptions, crisis management, nuclear powers

Introduction

In 1947 division of the Subcontinent escorted the end of British occupation and carved out on the map of the world two independent states India and Pakistan with a population of about 1 billion. That now a days consists of approximately 1.5 billion people that is about one-fifth of the world population and second and sixth largest populated

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countries accordingly.¹ But both countries since their inception has hostile relations that lead to the emergence of many crises in which some were managed and a few turned into wars. More risk has added to crisis since both countries become nuclear powers as well as the world entered into the post 9/11 era.² The continuing bitterness between Pakistan and India become more severe with the addition of threat perception generated crises.

The term crisis originates from the Greek word *krisis* which means “judgment” or “decision”. Some scholars thought this has the signs for “danger” and “opportunity”, 1962 Cuban missile crisis support this meaning. Connecting it to a time of severe tense situation between two big powers that transforms from danger into world war³. Charles Hermann described the crisis as such type of situation which carries features of surprise, a high risk to values and short time for decision⁴. According to some scholars crisis contains both elements of peace and war and has potential of conversion from peace to confrontation. The crisis can be managed or resolved and thus it can be plummet to a *modus vivendi* or even establishment of eternal peace between ex- opponents.

In international politics a crisis is a procedure of dealings occurring at upper level of supposed intensity as compare to normal occurrences of incidents and differentiate by: piercing rupture from the usual politics; shortness of time; made a perception that violence will originate; and major threat for the calmness of some system in global politics⁵. According to Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing an international crises is a series of contacts between the government of two or more countries in a severe conflict which carries high probability of war. According to policymakers crises start when the action or threat-ended action taken by a party that could put in danger a vital interest of a state status in the world

¹ Thakur, Ramesh, and Oddny Wiggen. "Introduction: South Asia's manifold challenge to the international community." in *South Asia in the world: Problem solving perspectives on security, sustainable development and good governance* ed. Oddny Wiggen (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004), 1-18

² Chari, Padmanabha Ranganatha, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen. *Four crises and a peace process: American engagement in South Asia* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 1-184

³ Snyder, Glenn Herald, and Paul Diesing. *Conflict among nations: Bargaining, decision making, and system structure in international crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 218-222.

⁴ Hermann, Charles F. "International crisis as a situational variable." In *International politics and foreign policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 409-421.

⁵ Oran R.Y. *The Politics of Force: Bargaining during Superpower Crisis* (Princeton Princeton: University Press 1968), 135-150.

community, or their own office consequently generate a condition of high risk. In such situation they think response time makes their crisis decisions different from other decisions⁶.

Regional crises lie in category of foreign policy crises because of the development of threat perception among regional powers to their values and interests⁷. Indian foreign policy trends in post9/11 showed that India tried to achieve the recognized rank of international actor. In this context, India adopted the following policy towards Pakistan. (a) Adopted policy to declare internationally Pakistan as “Harboring State” and promoter of terrorist activism. The Indian government tried to convince America as well as western powers refrain to from giving importance to Pakistan in war against terrorism⁸, because Pakistan remains involved in the promotion of terrorism for over a decade and is providing shelter to terrorists. Indian- Pakistan crises seem the application of the cold war design of continuous conflict nuclearization and limited war⁹. Despite of the presence of threat that crises between both countries might cross the nuclear verge, the perception that limited restricted war may be possible under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence particularly in India has prevailed.

Crises in Global Politics

In literature of global politics “crisis” perceive as a condition where there is “no war no peace”¹⁰, and two approaches substantive and procedural approaches are usually described. The Substantive approach deals with the components of crisis, and condition and ignores definitions and results of a specific incident of crisis. But the objective of the procedural approach discusses the theoretical interpretation of crises for the making of the procedural definition of crises and focuses on the resemblance of crises and does not discuss their specific components¹¹.

⁶ Richard Ned Lebow. *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981), 350.

⁷ Yusuf, Moeed. *Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments*(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020),83-152.

⁸ Jamshed.I. Role of the 9/11 and the US-led War on Terrorism in the Normalization of Relations Between India and Pakistan. *Journal of History & Culture*.XXVI/1(2015): 93-115 .

⁹ Kissinger, Henry, *Nuclear Weapons in Foreign Policy*(New York: Harper far Council on Foreign Relations,1957):1-455.

¹⁰ Houben, Marc. *International crisis management: The approach of European states*(London: Routledge, 2004),10- 344.

¹¹ Phillips, Warren, and Richard Rimkunas. "The concept of crisis in international politics." *Journal of Peace Research* 15, no. 3 (1978): 259-272.

Table 1: Different approaches of crisis management

Procedural Approach		
Main purpose		General theories about the formation of crises
Sub-approaches	Decision-making approach (subjective approach)	International systems approach (objective approach)
Analysis level	Bottom-up analysis: government, leadership, etc.	Top-down analysis: systemic level (global, regional systems, etc.)
Quality of crisis:	Foreign policy crisis	International crisis
Crisis types:	One-sided, two sided; symmetric, asymmetric crises	Global, regional, sub system, dominant system crises, etc.
Definition of crisis:	Perceived crisis (Hermann)	Reciprocal change of situation (McClelland); range of abnormal events (Young)

Source: Iuyar, Ömer Göksel. "Definition and management of international crises." *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 13, no. 3 (2008): 1-49.

Charles Herman discussed another approach the actor confrontation approach which examine two or more actors as unit involve in conflict communication and crisis bargaining. Regarding the definition of crisis international system approach does not describe appropriately the phenomenon of crisis management whereas decision making explains it.


Crisis and Crisis Management

In the perspective of the decision making approach there are two types of crises, one sided and two sided crises. In a one –sided crisis one actor may perceive a situation as a crisis or threat while rival or opponent may not perceive a similar situation as a crisis. For example in 1936 Leadership of Germany did not perceive the situation as a crisis when the region of Rhine had been re-militarized but other powers like Poland, France, England, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Belgium perceived crisis. A Two sided crisis is a situation that is perceived crisis by each opponent actors. In the cold war, the crisis were generally symmetrical because these were exploded between equal powers while the in post-cold war era crises were labeled as asymmetrical ones because they erupted between unequal powers¹².

¹² Stern, Eric K, “*Crisis decision-making: A cognitive institutional approach*” (PhD diss., University of Stockholm, 1999), 99–100.

Phases of Crisis

Crisis consists of four phases of maturation.



Source: Trumbore, Peter F., and Mark A. Boyer. "International crisis decision-making as a two-level process." *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 6 (2000): 679-697

Pre-Crisis phase

At this stage, preliminary signals of the crisis are perceived. Fear at the level of government increases and the crisis situation becomes clearer.

Crisis phase

At this level crisis has matured. Series of incidents starts occurring related to the crisis. At this stage decision-makers role enhanced and leadership could be evaluated

Crisis Abatement

If the government could not avoid the damages of crisis its credibility suffers. In case if the government succeed in minimize the harmful effects of the crisis it could be beneficiary of the consequences of the crisis.

Post phase

At this stage, the crisis settled. A well -organized crisis management is needed to minimize the harmful effects of a crisis or to extract some advantages. For good crisis management correct perception and its interpretation be required.

Components of Crisis

In the light of definitions of crises in international politics following components of crisis may be identified.

- I. Crises carry risks and may damage the actual or perceived interests, objectives or values of actors or governments¹³.
- II. Unpredicted happenings at the national or international level. It is the crux of crisis that the participants' have not control over the incident.
- III. National military activities increase particularly when crisis management processes continued.
- IV. Limited time for decision makers for deliberations and response. Decision - makers perceive themselves to be performing under a time restriction.¹⁴
- V. Limited options for decision-makers¹⁵.

Crisis Management activities

Following crisis management activities may be identified

- I. Emergency planning
- II. Identification of the risk and Analysis
- III. Deciding
- IV. Selection of alternatives
- V. Observing and monitoring
- VI. Feedback
- VII. Assessment of effectiveness of the decisions.

Approaches of Crisis Management

According to Glenn Synder 'the term crisis management used with a variety of meanings and importance.¹⁶ There are two school of thought. Scholars of the first school appraise crisis management purely and simply the peaceful resolution of confrontations. Success is dependent upon the prevention of war. According to them compulsive happening to be ended or diffused as quickly as possible. The objective is to regulate the situation and dampen down the situation. High risk must be evaded. It is claimed that if confronting parties perceive this act increase possibility of war then less risky alternatives will be adopted. The crisis itself is actual foe and contestants are real partners in the mission of eradicating the risks of war and maintaining things to normal.it is fully admitted that the fate of each country

¹³ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and influence*(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,1966),5-318

¹⁴ Richard Ned, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1984), 5-363.

¹⁵ Khalid, Iram, *Management of Pakistan India Conflicts: An Application of Crisis Decision-Making*(Lahore: Peace Publications, 2012),28-55.

¹⁶ Snyder, Glenn Herald, and Paul Diesing. *Conflict among nations: Bargaining, decision making, and system structure in international crises*(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015),419-462.

depends not only on its conduct but also on that of its adversary. Therefore, the mutual interests of participants are focused.

The second school of thought is opposite to the first and explains crisis management exclusively as an exercise in winning. The goal is to make the adversary back down, to gain a concession from it. Crises are not considered as compulsive or distasteful but instead regarded as a chance for glorification. The opposing state is the enemy instead of the crisis itself. It is not a partnership but violent rivalry or competition in which every effort is made to influence the opponent's behavior in desired directions. According to this school the central question is not will this act upsurge the possibility of war? But will it force the rival to capitulate? For achievement of the desirable results high risks can be taken. This school of thought seems to believe in crisis management as a zero-sum situation according to that achievement for one side loss for the other side or opponent.

There is a misconception of harmony of interests uniting the participants, but there are only conflicting interests that divide them. According to them, crisis management is the art of safeguarding that in this clash of interests one's will dominate. The Third school reflects a moderate picture and defines crisis management as to win a crisis, as well as at the same time lessen the danger and risk with those rival parties can bear¹⁷. For example according to Leslie Lipson, crisis management is reaching a solution both sides agree without war.¹⁸

Table 2: Events and their outcomes

Date	Events	Actions	Variables	Outcome
2001–02 (December 13, 2001 & May 14,2002)	Attacked on Indian Parliament and attacked on Kaluchak Indian military camp.	Mobilization of forces (Border Confrontation)	Pressure on Pakistan by America to reduce threat of cross border terrorist attacks and Pakistani assurances.	Start of peace process

¹⁷ Liping, Xia. "Crisis Management in the Relationship Between China and the United States." *International Review* 45 (2006):1-49.

¹⁸ Williams, Phil, *Crisis management: confrontation and diplomacy in the nuclear age* (London: Martin Robertson ,1976),10-83.

26 November 2008	Mumbai Blast	India holds to Pakistan responsible for non-state actors	Threat to Pakistan diplomatic status	Crisis recedes, the incoming administration of U.S President elected Barack Obama would be well-advised to lend quiet support to the Indo-Pak rapprochement process that had proven effective since 2003.
18 September 2016	Uri Attack	India claimed that it's security forces conducted" surgical strike" against training camps of militants in Pakistani side Kashmir.	India attempted to isolate Pakistan diplomatically.	Pulwama attack and rise of another crisis
14 February 2019	Pulwama Crisis	Both Countries conveyed aggressive threat-making signals and engaged in massive artillery exchange on the Line of Control.	The Bharatiya Janata Party's government in India wanted to attain some electoral mileage in the 2019 Lok sabha election.	Kashmir conflict highlighted as a core issue between Pakistan and India as well as nuclear flashpoint that requires serious global attention

Source: Chari, Padmanabha Ranganatha, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen. *Four crises and a peace process: American engagement in South Asia*. Brookings Institution Press, 2009

Perceptions and Decision making

Not only reasons and consequences of ways and methods of during decision making are studied to make conclusion but perception of decision makers is also tried to understand. Because plans and decisions must be mediated by the leader's aims, calculations, and perceptions.¹⁹ To explore the underlying causes, situation and interaction patterns decision-making analysis is necessary. For this purpose and to answer the question: do significant explanatory variables in global politics or international relations play role in decision-making? In the background of the term of perception, this may be divided into two sub questions first, Are major distinguishable differences in perceptions of decisions makers environments? And second "are there distinguishable differences between reality or fact and common perception?

The Problem of a similar level of analysis emerges not only functional but even on several levels, when these questions are discussed by many scholars and writers. Arnold Wolfers describes two, Kenneth Waltz proposes three, and according to James Rosenau are five. In which level one depends upon the nature of variables that effects the phenomena. In terms of the level of analysis one group of scholars has the opinion that prediction can be made about the actor's behavior if there is sufficient knowledge about the international, national or bureaucratic setting,²⁰ significance of variables may vary at different levels. According to Rosenau international environment affects small powers more as compare to big powers. Stanely Hoffman suggests nuclear arms and the bipolar system have reversed this relationship.

Generally, the significance of the other level declines if the variables in one level are in high states. According to Wolfers countries incline to respond or behave in a same manner when they are met with extreme threat or chance. But behavior will be different if environmental restrictions are less severe and these differences must be interpreted at the decision-making level. Complex relationship among the levels are also present. For example the impact of internal instability on expansionism could vary with the chances for success in war. Unstable countries may be more inclined towards aggression as compare to stable countries when the possibilities of success are high. But these states may be more careful than others when their decision makers perceive significant chances of loss or even temporary setback. On another side, the stability of the regime may affect its inclination

¹⁹ Jervis, Robert, *Perception and misperception in international politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 3-30.

²⁰ Ichheiser, Gustav, *Appearances and Realities* (San Francisco: Jessey-Bass, 1970), 9 7.

towards aggression, but a type of regime might be more significant in interpretation how it makes peace.

Crisis Management between India and Pakistan

Parties involved communicating perception of timing and severity of crisis differently. Even an incitement event may not perceive an equal threat to national values or interests. As well as earnestness of decision making or factor of unpredictability or risk of war may vary. It is a matter of routine Pakistan and India involve in cross-border fire across LoC without generating a crisis. Perception is an unpredictable variable that carries the potential of crisis between or among the states. If a country does not perceive the presence of elements of crisis in an incident it may not be felt threat. In perspective of Pakistan, India relations misperception about the mobilization of forces, gray zone incursions, terrorist activity of non-state actors, the threat of pre-emption, cross-border attacks leads towards crisis.

Military standoff 2001-2002

This crisis was triggered when a terrorist group on 13 December, 2001 attacked the Indian Parliament in which seven people killed and eighteen were injured. The Indian government alleged that Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba responsible for this attack and claimed that terrorists had links with Pakistan's intelligence agency (ISI). Instead of Pakistan's denial of allegation. India started operation Parakram (valor).²¹ Approximately 800,000 Indian troops were mobilized. Pakistan responds with a counter deployment both countries had a million soldiers for several months deployed on the international border.²² The situation further deteriorated on May 14, 2002 by terrorists attacked Kolchak camp, which housed the families of military personnel. Indian public opinion was exacerbated and demanded from the Indian government to take military action against Pakistan. According to General Durrani (retired) the Vajpayee government faced a "minimum political necessity" to deploy Indian forces,²³ and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government was competing for state elections.

When both states moved towards a militarized crisis bargaining converts in to a struggle in risk-taking, with each party firm to prove superior resolve. During the border crisis, leadership of both countries was involved in stimulating pretentiousness to establish

²¹ Moeed. "Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments", 83-152

²² Sasikumar, Karthika. "India-Pakistan crises under the nuclear shadow: The role of reassurance." *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 2, no. 1 (2019): 151-169.

²³ Dulat, Amarjit Singh, Asad Durrani, and Aditya Sinha. *The Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and the Illusion of Peace* (India: HarperCollins, 2018), 5-317.

their determination in the face of the possibility of nuclear war²⁴. According to Devin Hagerty and Sumit Ganguly the threat of nuclear options of Pakistan dominant in minds of decision-makers of India, so, this preventing India from use of option of war.²⁵

Because of the possibility of nuclear war United States becomes more sensitive than ever to the threats connected with armed crises between Pakistan and India. American officials constantly remained in contact with Indian officials, expressing sympathy and proposing help in the investigation. U.S. ambassador Robert Blackwill explained the similarity between 9/11 and December 13 attack by saying that attack on the Indian Parliament was no different in its goals from the 9/11 attack in the America.²⁶

American administration exerted pressure simultaneously on Pakistan and India through the Shuttle Diplomacy of Powell. In Islamabad, he forced Musharraf fulfils his commitment and in Delhi, he tried to give unofficial guarantee to the Indian officials regarding the sincerity of Musharraf. He assured Indian leadership that Pakistan is working to stop terrorist activities in and across its border.²⁷ He affirmed that infiltration is declining and U.S. Will continue to press Pakistan.²⁸ Because of American diplomatic pro activism India refrains from anticipating war.²⁹ The emphasis of diplomacy extended from immediate crisis management to a comprehensive strategic goals during this phase of lessening strain.

This crisis had the potential to turned into war whichever deliberate or by misperception or irrational decision making. The effort of big powers especially America defused the tensions. Finally the crisis diminished without an active war when India on 16 October 2002 decided to withdraw its forces from advanced positions along the

²⁴ Khan, S. “Nuclear weapons and the prolongation of the India-Pakistan rivalry”, eds. Paul, T. V., & Paul, T. V. *The India-Pakistan conflict: an enduring rivalry*. (New York :Cambridge University Press, 2005), 156-77.

²⁵ Ganguly, S., & Hagerty, D. T, *Fearful symmetry: India-Pakistan crises in the shadow of nuclear weapons* (Washington: University of Washington Press, 2012), 33-40

²⁶ Moeed, “*Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments*”, 83-152

²⁷ Kapur, S. Paul. "Ten years of instability in a nuclear South Asia." *International Security* 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 71-94.

²⁸ Chakma, B. (2016). South Asia's Nuclear Deterrence and the USA. In *The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia* (London: Routledge, 2016), 113-136

²⁹ Bajpai, Kanti “To War or Not a War: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2001-2002”, Eds. Ganguly, S., & Kapur, S. P. *Nuclear proliferation in South Asia: Crisis behaviour and the bomb* (London: Routledge, 2008), 174-194

international border.³⁰ On April 18 2003 after winning election Prime Minister of India Atal Bihari Vajpayee extended his hand of friendship to Pakistan.³¹ Pakistan's leadership adopted policy of avoidance and restraint to deescalate the crisis. On the occasion of the inaugural session of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit on January 5, 2002 in Kathmandu president of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf extended a hand to shake with the Indian prime minister. Although initial Indian response was cool and situation was not improved.

On January 12, Musharraf delivered a speech on national television. He asserted that no organization will be allowed to use names such as Sipah, Lashkar and Jaish and will not allow involvement in terrorist activities in the name of Kashmir³². He declared that the government banned five Pakistan-based militant organizations, frozen their assets and arrested their leaders.³³ India succeeded into forcing Pakistan to take strong action against militant groups³⁴ but failed to declare Pakistan as promoter of terrorism in Kashmir and crush the anti-Indian militants. America played a proactive role in crisis management with other powers like United Kingdom. Third party mediation played a key role in the management of a crisis. The crisis exhibited unexpected results of crisis management decisions. Travels advisories released by America and United Kingdom played significant role in de-escalation. Washington pressure kept India from armed conflict because of Pakistan, an important American ally in Afghanistan and the war on terrorism.³⁵

Mumbai Blast

This crisis emerges from a terrorist attack by non-state group.³⁶ Though an average of three terrorist incidents occurred daily in India, (According to the Global Terrorism database India had 1,019 terrorist incidents in 2016) but the government of India perceives its threat and feels in crisis when it is hit by an abnormal important terrorist attack which Indian government felt have roots in Pakistan. On 26 November 2008 few armed people

³⁰ Sood, V. K., Pravin Sawhney. *Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished* (London: Sage Publications Pvt. Limited, 2003), 81.

³¹ Dwan, Renata, and Micaela Gustavsson. "3. Major armed conflicts." *SIPRI Yearbook*, (2004): 95-131.

³² Khan, Zafar. "Crisis Management in Nuclear South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective." eds. Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland, *Investigating Crises: South Asia's Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories* (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2018), 143-162.

³³ Ranganatha, Cheema, and Cohen. *Four crises and a peace process*, 149-183.

³⁴ Moeed, "Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments", 83-121

³⁵ Kao, Philip K. "India and Pakistan: Managing Tensions." *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters* 50, no. 4 (2020): 9

³⁶ Perkovich, George, and Toby Dalton. *Not war, not peace?: motivating Pakistan to prevent cross-border terrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1-350.

attacked in Mumbai two luxury hotels, a Jewish center, a central train station and other targets. In these attacks more than 170 people were killed. These incidents in India denote as “26/ 11” and Indian government claimed these militants had links with Pakistan’s base Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Delhi perceived this incident as a threat to its interests and threatened Pakistan severe consequences. Islamabad also perceived Indian response on attacks as threat and situation became severe and converted into crisis. Internal pressure increased on India government people criticized the failure of forces to prevent and respond efficiently to the attacks. According to an American official some threat information had already been shared with the Indian government that there is a threat of attack by sea. After the attack Bombay fishermen’s Union spokesmen said that they had already informed the police suspicious movement and smuggling of volatile into the city by boat.³⁷

As described earlier sometimes because of domestic pressure and to satisfy the people of country’s government may create crisis situation. Under internal pressure Indian officials warned Pakistani officials of severe consequences.³⁸ Within Indian officials power voices were raised to take military action against Lashkar-e- Taiba or any other similar militant group suspected in attack and lessen the exacerbated sentiments.

Perception prevailed among Indian officials that because of unpredictability on Pakistan side there was a fear that decision makers of Pakistan could decide to choose disparate response with possibility of military action India restrained from military attack. Indian decision makers decided to launch media and international campaign for demanding action by Pakistan against suspected militant groups and perceived terrorist. Preserves inside the Pakistan. The objective of this campaign was to highlight India as the victim of terrorism and to paint internationally Pakistan as the promoter of terrorism and supporter of terrorists as well as cross border terrorism.

Islamabad responded to the Mumbai attack with diplomatic tools. Pakistan reacted with a blend of sympathetic statements toward sufferer, assurance of cooperation in the investigation, rejection of any connection in the attacks. Furthermore, aggressive replies and demonstration of force were also adopted. Pakistan to dilute the global pressure started crackdown on LeT. For example to avoid internationally isolation security agencies of

³⁷ Lakshmi, R. "Cabinet Minister resigns amid anger in India." *The Washington Post*, November 27, 2017.

³⁸ Khan, Riaz Mohammad. "Conflict Resolution and Crisis Management: Challenges in Pakistan–India Relations." *Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories*(Washington, DC: Stimson Center ,2018): 75-96.

Pakistan started incursions of offices of Jamaat-ud-Dawaall over the country. During this tense situation decision makers of Pakistan perceived a high threat of attack from India,³⁹ and officials of Pakistan sensed there was a 50 to 60 percent chance of Indian attack. A fake call to President Asif Ali Zardari turned the assumption into reality.⁴⁰

The most significant features of the crisis strategy of Pakistan were the use of the threat of war and accommodation of Indian as well as American demands. Pakistan used the American need of Pakistan because of its presence in Afghanistan as well as to get the support of Islamabad on the border of Afghanistan. The Incident of Mumbai attack shows to continuing inadequacies of attempts of America to accomplish its security interests in Pakistan as well as in the South Asian region. In the initial stage of the war on terror, the America was inclined to concentration its struggles on gaining the cooperation of Islamabad in tracking al Qaeda as well as to handle Taliban resurgence. America had learned lessons from the Twin Peak crisis. Crisis managers of U.S were convinced that America played a key role in management of the crisis as well as Pakistan and India had departed the crisis with diverse learning.⁴¹ The U.S. assimilated its previous skills as it proactively applied crisis diplomacy to guarantee nonappearance of an armed clash between Pakistan and India.

The 2008 Mumbai crisis did not move toward military escalation. The crisis management mechanism adopted by Pakistan was the willingness to cooperate in process of trial of the guilty alleged groups. Pakistan not only condemned the attack but assured full cooperation in the investigation to Indian government. Pakistan's mechanism for management of crisis for the Mumbai crisis 2008 focused on representing the goodwill and helping trial of the involved groups. Crisis of Mumbai comprised an amalgamation of operational and situational aspects that exerted Pressures to de-escalate and soothe the crisis. As compared to previous crises, there were no deployments of armed forces, despite adverse diplomatic gestures after attacks in December. The crisis was managed till mid-January with the help of American mediation. U.S. played an effective role to subside the crisis.

URI

³⁹ Hagerty, Devin T., "*India-Pakistan Crises, 1999–2016*" In *Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability in South Asia* (London: Palgrave Pivot, 2009), 11–42.

⁴⁰ Abbas, Zadi, "A Hoax Call That Could Have Triggered War." *Dawn*, December 6, 2008, 33.

⁴¹ Nayak, Polly, and Michael Krepon, "*US Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Peaks Crisis*" In *The Unfinished Crisis: US Crisis Management after the 2008 Mumbai Attacks*, (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2014), 14–48.

On 18 September 2016 armed militants group attacked the Indian army camp in the Uri area near the line of control and 19 Indian military personnel were killed. Indian government alleged that Pakistan's base militant organization Jaish-e-Mohammad was responsible for the attack. The Uri attack was the upshot of the killing of Burhan Wani the commander of Hizbul mujahedeen. Indian government declared him a terrorist. He had great fame among the Kashmiris particularly youth for the reason of his messages regarding freedom of Kashmir on social media.⁴² (Times of India, September 18, 2016) After his death, huge protests started against the Indian army and its cruelties as well as this incident led to the protest of Kashmiris and clashes with Indian police.⁴³ Attack on Indian army headquarters by militants also seemed the retaliation of Wani killing. Lt. Gen. Ranbir Singh Director General of Military Operations of India in a press conference accused Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) of the Uri attack as well as he alleged that Pakistan is a supporter of these militants. Indian government tried to isolate Pakistan globally by alleged that the terrorist attack had stemmed from Pakistani territory.⁴⁴

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 19th summit that was planned to be held in Pakistan from 9th November to 10th November cancelled because of tense situation at the line of control as a consequence of attacks on military camps in Uri by militants in Indian Held Kashmir.⁴⁵ Indian government slandered Pakistan and blamed Islamabad for attack without any solid proof as well as before finishing an appropriate investigation.⁴⁶ Indian officials deliberated several options to "react" and punished Pakistan, including the armed attack comprising overt or covert actions; exerted economic pressure through reduction trade relations and canceling the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status of Pakistan that had given in 1996 annulment of the Indus Water Treaty; and "internationally isolating" Pakistan.

Acting on the last, Indian government not only used the Uri attack, as an excuse to refuse attend the SAARC Summit⁴⁷ Delhi exerted pressure on other members of SAARC

⁴² *Times of India*, September 18, 2016

⁴³ Ghumman, Umer Javaid. "Nationalism in Indian Politics during PM Modi Regime (2014-19)." *Psychology and Education Journal* 58, no. 2 (2021): 10553-10559.

⁴⁴ Hashmi, Syed Moazzam Ali, Arshi Saleem Hashmi, and Javeria Farooqi. "Use of Soft Power by India as a Strategic Weapon: Media's Manipulation." *NDU Journal* 32, no. 1 (2018): 1-16.

⁴⁵ Waheed, Mirza. "India's Crackdown in Kashmir: Is this the World's first mass blinding?." *The Guardian* November 8, 2016, 8.

⁴⁶ Ahmad, Manzoor. "SAARC Summits 1985-2016: The Cancellation Phenomenon." *IPRI Journal* 17, no. 1 (2017): 43-71.

⁴⁷ Mittal, Devika, and Amit Ranjan. "India-Pakistan: Contours of Relationship." *Space and Culture, India* 4, no. 1 (2016): 6-18

refused to participate in Summit⁴⁸. Consequently, under Indian pressure Bangladesh, Bhutan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal had refused to attend the summit,⁴⁹ therefore, the summit could not be held in Islamabad.⁵⁰

After 10 days of Uri attack India claimed that its security forces conducted "surgical strike" against training camps of militants in Pakistan's side Kashmir in which 70-80 militants killed.⁵¹ But India did not prove its claim and there was a considerable doubt and confusion about casualties and target area. India attempted to isolate Pakistan diplomatically. Pakistan rejected the Indian claim and denied any attack in its side of Kashmir. By producing the required noise about it, Delhi managed to receive the attention of the international community though, and the main target addressees were domestic.⁵²

Nuclear Pakistan kept restraints on the capability of India to replied Pakistan with force. American diplomacy also played a significant role to avoid New Delhi armed option.⁵³ At that time Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division's head was Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, who said that the purpose of strategic nuclear arms of Pakistan is to "pour cold water on Cold Start".⁵⁴ Army of Pakistan invited media persons and visited them the LoC where the Indian army claimed of did attacks but nothing substantial was found.

⁴⁸ Roy, Shubhajit, "To Isolate Pakistan in Neighbourhood, India Pulls out of Islamabad SAARC Summit," *Indian Express*, September 28, 2016, <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/to-isolate-pakistan-in-neighbourhood-india-pulls-out-of-islamabad-saarc-summit-3053697/>

⁴⁹ Sajjad, Baqir, "SAARC Summit Put off Indefinitely," *Dawn*, October 1, 2016, 3.

⁵⁰ "Pakistan Announces Postponement of 19th SAARC Summit," *Express Tribune*, September 30, 2016, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1191432/pakistan-announces-postponement-19th-saarc-summit/>

⁵¹ Gokhale, Nitin A. *Securing India the Modi Way: Pathankot, Surgical Strikes and More* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 1-254.

⁵² Snow, Shawn. "Is India Capable of a Surgical Strike in Pakistan Controlled Kashmir?." *The Diplomat*, September, 30, 2016, 1
<https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/is-india-capable-of-a-surgical-strike-in-pakistan-controlled-kashmir/>

⁵³ Reddy, P. Krishna Mohan. "Dealing with Pakistan: Dimensions and Dilemmas" *Area Studies* (10) 1 (Jan -June 2016):1-9.

⁵⁴ Smith, David O. "The US experience with tactical nuclear weapons: lessons for South Asia" In *Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia*, eds. Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (Washington D.C.: The Stimson Center, 2013), 32.

Officials of Pakistan repeated that at LoC cross border firing was did on 28-29 September.⁵⁵ According to Karnad the concept of the “surgical strike” remained questionable instead of *becoming* a necessary part of a grand strategy of India. From a deterrence point of view, it reflected a vague image, wherever, Islamabad refuted, that such attack had occurred. On another side, the government of India failed to offer any evidence of the strike.⁵⁶ Modi government planned to use Uri attack to portrait Pakistan as a sponsor of terrorism. To achieve this objective India did lobby in the Congress and Ted Poe, introduced a bill in house of Representatives to declare Pakistan as a country promoter of terrorism.

Because of the presence of approximately 10,000 American troops in Afghanistan cooperation with Pakistan was important for Washington. Instead of this fact that the American administration did not satisfy with Pakistan role in Afghanistan and was following “Do more Policy” the White House had no intention to rock the boat by declaring Pakistan a state promoter of terrorism. It must be noted that there is considerable doubt and confusion about the location of the targets and number of casualties in the raids.⁵⁷

The Indian post-Uri strategy revealed that India had selected for a first-time varied strategy to threat Islamabad’s use of non-state actors. The use and announcement in public of restricted surgical strikes to directly attacked terrorists was part of a more conventional policy to guarantee the reliability of its military deterrence capabilities. As well as Delhi used economic sanctions to raise the financial costs related to Pakistan’s recourse to low-intensity war. Delhi also used tactics that are typically opted by secondary powers to fix the behavior of unipolar powers’ for-instance organizational balancing and collaboration by the SAARC to cutoff Pakistan.⁵⁸ Institutional balancing was used in September 2017 when BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit was held. In the declaration of Summit criticized terrorist groups, comprising the LeT, JeM and Haqqani networks, which have been operating in Pakistan.⁵⁹ These compound attempts have wanted to enhance the economic, military, and diplomatic costs for Pakistan to opt use non-state proxy war to add its advantages.

⁵⁵ Agency desk, “Surgical strikes: Journalists flown to LoC to debunk Indian Myth.” *Tribune*, October 02, 2016, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1192133/surgical-strikes-journalists-flown-loc-debunk-indian-myth/>

⁵⁶ Karnad, Bharat. *Staggering Forward: Narendra Modi and India's Global Ambition*. (New Delhi: Penguin Random House, 2018), 173-175.

⁵⁷ He, Kai. "Contested regional orders and institutional balancing in the Asia Pacific." *International Politics* 52, no. 2 (2015): 208-222.

⁵⁸ Bharat, *Staggering Forward: Narendra Modi and India's Global Ambition*, 174.

⁵⁹ Blarel, Nicolas, and Hannes Ebert. "Deterring to Lead? Nuclear Crises, Non-State Proxies, and India's Regional Leadership." *Rising Powers Quarterly* 3, no. 1 (2019): 45-63.

According to General (retired) Durrani former head of the Pakistani military intelligence service declared the Indian claim as a face-saving strategy of the BJP government.⁶⁰ Uri incident turned into a high-profile crisis since the Mumbai attack 2008. This crisis was different in a way that Indian official's particularly political leadership's loud public posturing objective at extracting domestic political benefit. Indian leadership declared the attack as a one-off preemptive strike however transmit signals to American officials that India is interested in close up of episode.

Pulwama Crisis

On 14 February 2019 in Pulwama district in Indian held Kashmir, a paramilitary convoy consists of more than 2,500 security personnel hit by a car carrying explosives. In this attack at least 40 personnel of the 76th Battalion killed and several were injured. India blamed Pakistan's base militant group Jaish-e-Muhammad is responsible for this attack but Pakistan denied any links of terrorists involved in this attack with Pakistan. A massive political uproar was observed in India.⁶¹ Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi not only condemned but also gave full freedom to security forces to retaliate against this attack. India annulled Pakistan's most favored nation status and raised 200% customs duty on all Pakistani goods imported to India. Delhi also launched an offensive diplomatic move against Pakistan and briefed diplomats of 25 countries including China, America, United Kingdom, Russia and France.

Two perceptions prevailed among Pakistani official about this crisis. Firstly Pakistan's decision makers believed that it was a false flag operation planed by the Indian ruling party (Bharaitya Janta Party) to receive popularity in the coming general election in India. Pakistan's Prime Minister said that it is illogical to blame Pakistan for this attack because at the Saudi Crown Prince visit to Pakistan how Pakistan damage its diplomatic and economic interests by indulged in this attack Secondly, mostly Pakistan's official believed that it was locally planed by Kashmiris in response to Indian policy towards Kashmiris. In response on 26th February 2019, twelve Indian Air Force Mirage 2000 crossed the line of control and dropped bombs into Balakot Azad Kashmir.⁶² India claimed that it destroyed the training camps of Jaish-e-Muhammad camp in which 300 to 350 casualties

⁶⁰ Dulat, Amarjit Singh, Asad Durrani, and Aditya Sinha. *The Spy Chronicles: RAW, ISI and the Illusion of Peace* (India: HarperCollins, 2018), 1-255

⁶¹ Yusuf, Moeed The Pulwama Crisis: Flirting With War in a Nuclear Environment, Arms control today May 2019 <https://www.armscontrol.org/archive/act>

⁶² Ghumman, Umer Javaid. "Nationalism in Indian Politics during PM Modi Regime (2014-19)." *Psychology and Education Journal* 58, no. 2 (2021): 10553-10559.

happened.⁶³ Pakistan reacted within 24 hours and shot down Indian aircrafts and captured an Indian pilot.⁶⁴

Both countries perceived the situation threat to their security and crisis was reached on the edge of full major war. India planned to launch multiple conventional missile attacks inside Pakistan and Islamabad also assured an abrupt and scaled-up reaction. Both countries conveyed aggressive threat-making signals and engaged in massive artillery exchange on the Line of Control. In just few days the situation had become worsen and turned into the most dangerous crisis after both states became nuclear power. But after Pakistan decision to release the captured Indian Pilot tensions lessened rather abruptly over the next few days. During a crisis neither government sent overt 'nuclear signals'. After the meeting of Pakistan's National Command Authority which has had power to use nuclear weapons since 2018 held first meeting did not issue public statement. Although both states officials seem to avoid nuclear escalation during the Pulwama crisis, their perception that crisis will be managed without threats of nuclear armed clash can generate risks of misperceived outcomes between nuclear power rivals.

Conclusion

In last two decades, many crises emerged between Pakistan and India. Instead of the fact that nuclear singling and unusual movements around nuclear sites aggravated the situation, none of these endangered to cross the nuclear brink and crises managed without turned into war. Nuclear arms assured strategic stability in South Asian region by maintained deterrence from large-scale armed conflict and that the world powers will interfere when a crisis reaches on the brink of severe escalation. But nuclear deterrence may not avoid the low-scale violent clash, as well as the emergence of future crises between Pakistan and India except both states evolve alternate strategies of confidence-building and crisis management. This threat is particularly evident during the Uri and Pulwama crises and India readiness to executed cross-border surgical strikes. Perception and misperception of decision makers played very significant role in appearance and the management of these crises. When decision makers of both rivals' states perceived or misperceived that their desire results are approximately achieved they showed willingness to move towards management of crisis.

⁶³ *The Hindu*, 27 February, 2019

⁶⁴ *Dawn*, 28 February, 2019